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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
The majority thought that the extensive psychiatric testimony elicited in the
case clearly presented the question, and had been weighed and rejected by the
jury. The dissent opined that forcing the defense psychiatrist to give categorical
answers created the impression that defendant's alleged delusions, though they
convinced him that his act was not morally wrong, were still not wthin the definition of section 1120.
The dissent stated that the court's charge on the insanity question was a bare
reading of the applicable section of the Penal Law. 7 2 In such case the judge's failure
to explain the proper interpretation of "wrong" should in itself be valid ground
for reversal.
Pablic Trial
The cynosure of the tabloids, People v. Jelke,73 presented the question of
whether a trial judge can exclude, over defendant's objection, the press and idle
spectators from a compulsory prostitution trial.74 The court held the right of
"public trial" 75 to be such a basic privilege that a trial judge has discretion to
exclude only in those instances enumerated in section four of the Judiciary Law,70
and anticipation of filthy and indecent testimony is not sufficient. A persuasive
dissent by Judges Desmond and Conway refused to concede that tradition compels
allowing the public admittance to "sex trials."77 They argued that the public trial
requirement has always been subject to the inherent power of the trial court to
exclude in order to facilitate the testimony of emotionally disturbed witnesses,78 or
to limit their number to prevent overcrowding or disorder.79 Therefore, this right
72. That the charge should be illuminated by reference to the evidence in

the case, so that the jury can properly apply the law to the facts, see People v.
Fanning, 131 N. Y. 659, 30 N. E. 569 (1892); People v. Becker, 210 N. Y. 274, 104
N. E. 396 (1914).
73. 308 N. Y. 56, 123 N. E. 2d 769 (1954).
74. N. Y. PENAL LAV §2460.
75. N. Y. JUDICIAiY LAW §4, provides: "The sittings of every court within
this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, except

that in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, bastardy or
filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are
not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the
court."
N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §12, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
has a right to a speedy and public trial . . ."
N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §8, provides: "In a criminal action the defendant is entitled (1) To a speedy and public trial . .
76. Supra, note .75.
77. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 379 (6th ed. 1890); ABBOTT, TRA.L
BRIEF, CRIMINAL CAUSES, §157 (1st ed. 1889); 6

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE,

338 (3d ed.

1940). See People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. Supp. 433 (4th Dep't 1900).
78, Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S. W. 2d 931 (1935); Moore v. State,
151 Ga. 648, 108 S. E. 47 (1921); State v. Damm, 62 S. D. 123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933);
State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 22 Minn. 145, 149, 21 N. W. 2d 328, 331 (1946).
79. People v. Miller, 257 N. Y. 54, 60, 177 N. E. 306, 308 (1931); Reagan v.
United States, 202 Fed. 488, 489-490 (9th Cir. 1913).
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is not so sacrosanct that it cannot yield when there is danger of impairment of
public morals in allowing free entrance and reporting of filthy sexual episodes.
Heavy criticism might be leveled at the majority for its dogmatic invocation
of the unius expressio, alterius exciusio canon decried by modern writers8 0 The
concept of statutory analogy"" would have induced an opposite result, for the
unbridled publicity given this case is an example of the precise evil which the
legislature intended to correct by section four of the Judiciary Law. This is espec82
ially clear in that the trend, as evinced by the legislative history of that section,
has been to allow the trial judge greater latitude in excluding the prurient from
attempting to view and report salacious testimony in the courts.
The connected case of United Press Association v.Valente 3 tested the right
of the press to object to an exclusion order. The Court held that the 'applicable
language of the Judiciary Law, "The sitting of every court within this state shall
be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, 84 is to be historically
construed8 5 as affording freedom of access and protection from arrest to those
whose presence was essential to the work of the court, and affords no rights to
mere spectators. Hence an accused may waive his right to a public trial if the
trial judge permits.
Judge Desmond, in a separate opinion, concurs with the result on the ground
of his dissent in the Jelke case, citing the majority's ratio decidendi as specious.
The dissent joins issue on the ground that common law tradition, 0 as embodied
in section four of the Judiciary Law, guarantees the public an enforceable right
to view and report judicial proceedings. The dissenters also feared that justice
might be subverted if the judge and the accused could combine to bar the press
and public from certain trials.
Evidence
In People v. Dales,8 7 defendant was convicted of forgery in the second degree
80. See LENHOFF, CASES AND COMMENTS ON LEGISLATION, 692 (1949); Beutel,
Problems of Interpretation Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, 27 NEB. L.
REv. 485, 491 (1948).
81. LENHOFF, op. cit. supra, note 80, at 945.
83. Section 4 was amended in 1945 to include sodomy and fillation proceedings.
83. 308 N. Y. 71, 123 N. E. 2d 777 (1954).
84. N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW §4 (3).
85. The court referred to 1 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEw YORK 159-160 (1894),
respecting freedom from arrest of all persons voluntarily attending court on

court business.

86. "These words are of great importance, for all causes ought to be heard,
ordered, and determined before the judges of the kings courts openly In the
kings courts, whither all persons may resort." COKE'S SECOND INSTITUTES, V. 1,
p. 703 (1797); (emphasis supplied).

87. 309 N. Y. 97, 127 N. E. 2d 829 (1955).

